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Abstract: 
In England and Wales, Section 15 of the Sexual Offences Act (2003) criminalizes the act of meeting a 
child –someone under 16—after grooming. The question to be pursued in this paper is whether 
grooming –I confine myself to online grooming—is justly criminalized. I shall argue that it is. One 
line of thought will be indirect. I shall first try to rebut a general argument against the criminalization 
of acts that are preparatory to the commission of serious offences. Grooming is one such act, but there 
are others, sometimes associated with terrorism.  According to me, the general argument misapplies 
certain considerations about autonomy that are alleged to be in force in other areas of criminal law. 
Contrary to that general argument, criminalization of preparatory acts does not, in general, bypass the 
agency of citizens. Moreover, the criminalization of preparatory acts can disrupt activity that would 
have led to very serious crime, and with relatively low costs to the perpetrators, costs that reflect the 
non-occurrence of the more serious crime. There is evidence that grooming is harmful in itself, and so 
another point against the general argument is its assumption that preparatory offences are often 
harmless or at least victimless. There are objections to some of the undercover policing techniques  
that lead to a Section 15 prosecution, but these objections are not all weighty. 
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Grooming occurs when an adult prepares someone –usually a child—for sexual contact. This 
behaviour is criminalized in many jurisdictions, and it is one of a range of offences that have been 
called into question by critics of preventive justice.1 In England and Wales, Section 15 of the Sexual 
Offences Act (2003) criminalizes the act of meeting a child –someone under 16—after grooming. The 
offender must be over 18, and must have met or communicated with the child at least twice. In 
addition, the offender must have intended to meet the child and travelled to the meeting intending to 
commit one of a range of offences defined in Part One of the Act. These range from outright rape to a 
variety of sexual assaults. Part One distinguishes between, on the one hand, rape and assaults against 
children under 13, and cases where the victims are older but under 16. Section 15 has some distinctive 
features. For example, it applies to international travel, some part of which is within the domestic 
jurisdiction. This means that if someone in London who was engaged in the online grooming of a 
child in e.g. Thailand or America flew out from England or Wales to meet that person, intending to 
engage in a sort of sexual contact outlawed in England and Wales, that traveller would still be liable 
to prosecution on returning to England and Wales. Offences under section 15 are punishable by a 
maximum of 10 years imprisonment on indictment. 
The question to be pursued in this paper is whether grooming –I confine myself to online grooming—
is justly criminalized as in Section 15. I shall argue that it is. One line of thought will be indirect. I 
shall first try to rebut a general argument against the criminalization of acts that are preparatory to the 
commission of serious offences. Grooming is one such act, but there are others, sometimes associated 
with terrorism.  According to me, the general argument misapplies certain considerations about 
autonomy that are alleged to be in force in other areas of criminal law. Contrary to that general 
argument, criminalization of preparatory acts does not, in general, bypass the agency of citizens. 
Moreover, the criminalization of preparatory acts can disrupt activity that would have led to very 
serious crime, and with relatively low costs to the perpetrators, costs that reflect the non-occurrence of 
the more serious crime. There is evidence that grooming is harmful in itself, and so another point 
against the general argument is its assumption that preparatory offences are often harmless or at least 
victimless. 
The rest of this paper falls into four parts. In the first, I introduce the Section 15 offence and indicate 
the number of prosecutions that have been brought under it since 2006. Next, I expound and criticize 
the general argument against criminalizing preparatory offences. I go on in the third section to give 
reasons why the approach to grooming in section 15 of the Sexual Offences Act in particular is 
justifiable. First, it effectively distinguishes between “contact” groomers and “fantasy” groomers, 2 
removing doubt about grooming offences based on the possible remoteness of grooming behaviour 
from actual sexual contact.  Second, s.15 distinguishes between, on the one hand, the sexualization of 
online behaviour between children, and, on the other, grooming by forensically aware adult 
paedophiles who sometimes pose as sexualized children. In the final section, I discuss the justifiability 
of two kinds of undercover operations that are used to collect evidence for prosecutions of Section 15 
offences. I argue that while the two kinds of operations are morally different, and one is normally 
more objectionable than the other, both are often morally justifiable on balance.  
                                                          
1 A Ashworth and L Zedner, Preventive Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p.99. Daniel Ohana, ‘Responding 
to acts preparatory to the commission of a crime: Criminalization or prevention?’ Criminal Justice Ethics 25 (2006) pp. 23-
39. See also Petter Asp, ‘Preventionism and Criminalization of Nonconsummate Offences’ in  A Ashworth, L Zedner, and P. 
Tomlin, eds. Prevention and the Limits of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p.23; p. 25; p. 28.  
2 Stephen Webster et al, European Online Grooming Project, Final Report, 2012: 
http://www.europeanonlinegroomingproject.com/media/2076/european-online-grooming-project-final-report.pdf 
3 
 
 
1.Meeting a Child after Grooming 
Section 15 is in keeping with, if not motivated by, the following line of thought about serious crime: 
The more serious a crime –understood in relation to a scale of harm and culpability—the 
more urgent it is to prevent it. Prevention can sometimes take the form of criminalizing 
component offences, or criminalizing steps that, while apparently harmless in isolation, 
characteristically lead to the intentional commission of the serious crime. The penalty for the 
commission of the component or preparatory offences is of course lighter, sometimes much 
lighter, than the penalty for the full blown offence (2 years in prison is the starting point for a 
section 15 offence against a child over 13 but under 16), so that defendants convicted of them 
do not suffer disproportionately. More importantly, the availability of these offences allows 
charges to be brought against suspects before serious harm can be done. Even if the 
proceedings arising from these charges produce no conviction, bringing charges can itself 
disrupt a course of action that might have led to serious harm and that would have been more 
difficult to disrupt if it had been allowed to run on.  
Here ‘serious crime’ refers to a Part One offence, such as rape or assault of someone under 13 or 16: 
if the criminalization of grooming prevents this sort of crime, then, according to the line of thought 
just articulated, it is justified. 
When associated with the internet, Section 15 prosecutions usually involve a record of online chat 
between the suspect and a child. Online chat rooms can be visited speculatively by groomers, or visits 
there can follow contact on social networking websites which contain very detailed profiles and 
sometimes photos of children who become grooming targets. Chat room contact typically begins with 
introductions and an indication of ages and gender. Names –usually pseudonyms—will be exchanged. 
Then a process will begin in which the suspect will gather information about the child and show 
interest or admiration. Along the way, mobile telephone numbers (or even email and home addresses) 
will have been exchanged.  
Online chat is orchestrated by the groomer in such a way that it eventually turns to the discussion of 
sex. The groomer will often send pornography to the child, and prompt sexualized text or chat room 
messages. Sometimes the suspect will be interested in the sexual experience of the child, and will 
offer to teach the child sexual techniques. At other times the suspect will induce the child to produce 
sexualized webcam or smartphone images of herself. (The vast majority of grooming targets are 
female.) Then a meeting may be proposed, sometimes at a place that the child suggests. The chat 
record may contain evidence of an agreement to engage in sexual contact, in which case the makings 
of a Section 15 prosecution are in place, other things being equal. The chat record may also reveal 
evidence of the suspect’s awareness of the risks of arrest should the plans for the meeting be 
discovered by parents or come to the attention of the authorities. 
Arrests on Section 15 charges are sometimes made after parents discover that their child is engaged in 
sexualized online conversation. The police are informed, and sometimes, with the appropriate 
authorizations under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (2000) (RIPA), undercover officers 
will assume the online identity of the child until the arrangement to meet is proposed by the groomer. 
Police will then arrest the suspect at the proposed meeting place. While the suspect is being 
questioned, the police will carry out an authorized search of the suspect’s home address and seize 
computers. Subsequent investigation sometimes reveals downloaded indecent images of children, and 
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sometimes even evidence of participation in online paedophile groups. In such cases further charges 
can be brought. 
Section 15 arrests can also be made on the basis of the action of online vigilantes. These are civilians 
who pose as children on social media sites and cultivate approaches for sex from groomers. Like 
undercover police, they will carry on a protracted online conversation with a suspect, agree to a 
meeting, and then, when the suspect arrives, confront him on camera. The film is subsequently posted 
online as an act of exposing a paedophile. The police  in England and Wales sometimes act on 
information provided by the vigilantes, but the guidance from the Department of Public Prosecutions 
(DPP) on the use of this material points to difficulties with vigilante operations in relation to RIPA,3 
and a Memorandum of Understanding between the Crown Prosecution Service and the Association of 
Chief Police Officers is critical of vigilante operations, and excludes certain defences by vigilantes 
against charges for making indecent images, even if that was done to gain the trust of a suspect in the 
course of a “sting” operation.  
McGuire and Dowling have summarized proceedings under Section 15 between 2006 and 2012:4 
 
Table 1. Section 15 proceedings by year and gender of victim, 2006-2012 
Table 1 is not confined to cases of proceedings launched against suspects after online grooming alone, 
and many more grooming offences were recorded by police than were proceeded against:5 
                                                          
3 http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/rape_and_sexual_offences/soa_2003_and_soa_1956/#a29 
4 M McGuire and S Dowling, Cyber-crime: A Review of the Evidence (London: HMSO, 2013), ch. 3. This table makes 
confusing reading. It will quickly be noticed that the number of those sentenced in a given year can exceed the number 
proceeded against in that year. This because cases can carry over from one year to the next, with sentencing in a year later 
than proceedings started. 
5 McGuire and Dowling, op. cit. p. 8 
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Table 2. Number of recorded grooming offences by year in England and Wales, 2004-2013. 
Tables 1 and 2 show that the number of grooming offences is relatively low,6 that the number of 
prosecutions is lower still, but that the conviction rate for those prosecuted is high. There are much 
larger numbers of recorded offences of possessing, making and distributing indecent images 
compared to grooming offences. For example, charges of making an indecent photograph of a child 
were brought in over 14,000 cases in 2012-13, 7 dwarfing the numbers of Section 15 proceedings.  
 
2. Section 15 and general objections against preparatory offences 
What, if anything, is morally wrong with Section 15? It would certainly be criticizable if it 
incorporated stereotypes about grooming that are not borne out by relevant empirical research. It 
would equally be open to criticism if prosecutions under it regularly failed. I shall consider the 
criticism that it carries risks of injustice associated with the criminalization of preparatory offences. 
Ashworth and Zedner have developed this sort of criticism.8  They include section 15 among 
preparatory or pre-inchoate offences, one of 9 categories of preventive offences they recognize. 
Preparatory and pre-inchoate offences include heavily criticized provisions of the UK Terrorism Acts. 
Ashworth and Zedner argue against the criminalization of acts in this category from two directions: 
they (a) try to undercut some of the general defences of their criminalization on the basis of the harm 
principle, and (b) introduce and justify “restraining principles” for preparatory offences.  I argue that 
neither approach is entirely successful against the whole range of preparatory offences and that, in 
particular, section 15 survives both kinds of criticism. 
The reasoning behind the criminalization of preparatory acts might be put as follows.  
“If a type of act A is very harmful, say because it produces fatal or life-threatening injury on a 
large scale, then the prevention of a type-A act is justified, other things being equal. The 
prevention of a type-A act is a matter of the prevention or discouragement of a type-B act, 
where a type-B act characteristically precedes and facilitates a type-A act. Where type-A is a 
co-ordinated suicide-bomb attack, type-B acts might include online or offline meetings to 
recruit possible attackers; online or offline meetings to plan an attack; purchases of bomb-
making materials; communications with people known by the police to have bomb-making 
expertise; and so on. To the extent that there is evidence that a Type-B act is likely to 
contribute to a Type-A act, the harm caused by the Type-A act justifies the criminalization of 
the Type-B act.” 9 
                                                          
6 But the corresponding American figures are much higher. In 2006 there were more than 6,300 reports of online 
“enticement” of children, up from 2600 the previous year. See K Raymond Choo, Online Child Grooming: A Literature 
Review  on the Misuse of   Social Networking Sites for Grooming Children for Sexual Offences grooming( Canberra: 
Australian Institute of Criminology, 2007) p.25. 
7 Under Protection of Children Act 1978, Ss.1(1)(a) and 6. See McGuire and Dowling, p.15 
8 A Ashworth and L Zedner Preventive Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) p. 110 
9 This reasoning is in keeping with what Simester and von Hirsch (Crimes, Harms and Wrongs (Oxford: Hart, 2011) call the 
Standard Harm Analysis, even though instances of Type A and Type B acts may be temporally remote from one another. 
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The most obvious problem with this reasoning is that type-B acts can contribute not only to Type-A 
acts but also to perfectly harmless Type-C acts. For example, the purchase of large amounts of 
fertilizer can contribute to bomb-making for a terrorist attack, but it can also contribute to a perfectly 
harmless, or indeed beneficial, agricultural enterprise.  
Ashworth’s and Zedner’s argument against preparatory offences is partly to do with the fact that 
perfectly harmless and ordinary behaviour as well as acts leading to terrorism can be eligible for 
charges; in addition, Ashworth and Zedner give weight to the chilling effect: people being put off 
harmless and legal behaviour leading to Type-C acts for fear of being taken by the authorities to be 
preparing Type-A acts. In general, Ashworth and Zedner hold that preparatory offences limit the 
liberties of everyone in some ways, and disproportionately limit the liberties of the few –for example, 
those fitting discriminatory stereotypes that might be implicit in profiles of potential terrorists. 10 More 
generally, Ashworth and Zedner criticize arguments from harm for what they regard as their utilitarian 
bias. The arguments may look irresistible when rightness or wrongness itself is a function of harm and 
benefit, but liberty is valuable, too, even when it is potentially harmful, and the argument from harm 
for preparatory offences arguably fails to give liberty enough weight.11   
The force of this sort of argument varies with the range of preparatory offences associated with the 
production of serious harm. Ashworth and Zedner do not show that it is unjust for the police ever to 
take an interest in anyone who buys large quantities of fertiliser. There are good reasons for the police 
to look into such a purchase, notwithstanding the innocent uses of large quantities of fertiliser. 
Similarly with other ingredients of explosives.  In UK terrorism legislation, however, many things 
other than purchasing bomb-making equipment are taken to facilitate violent offences, including some 
kinds of non-disclosure, and some very vaguely specified kinds of possession. The looser the 
association of these with the preparation of a terrorist attack, the more the limitation of liberty 
involved in their criminalization seems disproportionate.  
Only when the association between criminalized acts and the harm of terrorism is very loose does the 
Ashworth-Zedner position acquire real force.12  And even in these cases their position may be 
overdrawn relative to the practice of police and prosecutors. For the fact that certain sections of the 
Terrorism Act (e.g, sections 1 and 75)  are arguably too vague, or set the threshold for contributing to 
a terrorist act too low, needs to be taken together with the fact that that the authorities have brought 
few or no prosecutions under them.13  
Again, the fact that a lot of behaviour criminalized under the Terrorism Act (2000) can easily turn out 
to be harmless means that the burden of showing in a particular case that the behaviour is harmful is 
not a trivial one. The burden is made even harder to discharge by the fact that people who conspire to 
prepare acts of terrorism are often forensically aware and, as a result, conduct their electronically 
                                                          
10 Ibid  p. 104 
11 Ibid. 
12 See also Simester and von Hirsch, op.cit. ch. 13. 
13 According to the most recent (2014) statistics (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/operation-of-police-powers-
under-the-terrorism-act-2000-financial-year-ending-march-2014/operation-of-police-powers-under-the-terrorism-act-2000-
and-subsequent-legislation-arrests-outcomes-and-stops-and-searches-great-britain-financial ), “of the 460 persons charged 
under terrorism legislation since 11 September 2001 the main principal charges related to: possession of an article for 
terrorist purposes (16% of such charges);preparation for terrorist acts (16%);failing to comply with duty at a port or border 
controls (16%);collection of information useful for an act of terrorism (10%);fundraising (10%).” In this respect the 
independence of the Dept. of Public Prosecutions counteracts remnants in Terrorism legislation of populist provisions whose 
introduction was more a matter of pose or gesture than of considerations of practicability. 
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intercepted conversations in coded vocabulary. These facts translate into obstacles in the way of 
successful prosecutions under the Terrorism Acts, and so obstacles to the loss of liberty.  
Even when charges are brought against suspects for preparatory offences, clear evidence of an 
intention to mount a lethal attack may be hard to adduce. Does this fact show that preparatory acts 
should not be criminalized in the first place? No, and neither does it show that criminalization cannot 
help with prevention. After all, with the preparatory offence in place, the mere act of bringing charges 
under it may be enough to disrupt the preparation of a terrorist act by someone against whom a 
successful prosecution cannot be brought, and the charges can communicate to all concerned that 
certain people have come to police attention and that their future participation in harm-producing 
conspiracies would probably attract police attention, too. This message may well set back the plans of 
terrorist conspirators, and it can be conveyed whether or not a subsequent prosecution fails. In this 
way criminalization aids disruption but not necessarily disruption that deprives anyone –including 
anyone innocent-- of their freedom.   It is not obvious, in fact, that any harm is necessary inflicted on 
anyone by disruption without arrest. (On the other hand, disruption that includes arrest can be harmful 
to the extent that arrest by itself is stigmatizing.) 
If the Ashworth-Zedner criticism of appeals to harm by defenders of the criminalization of 
preparatory offences is less than conclusive, what are we to say of their arguments for restraining 
principles for preparatory offences? One restraining principle is that acts that are criminalized not be 
too remote from the production of harm.14 But how remote is too remote? Some preparatory acts 
might involve no intention to produce harm oneself at all, as when one publicly approves of some past 
terrorist act without any encouragement to anyone to follow its example. But suppose that someone 
actually produces a working bomb with the intention of detonating it as an act of jihad, but then has a 
change of heart and abandons the jihadist project. Should the production of the bomb still attract a 
conviction under section 5 of the Terrorism Act (2006) if charges are brought after the change of 
heart? And should we say that where there is a possibility of a change of heart that criminalization is 
out of order and only starts to be in order when a point of no return has been reached?  
Ashworth and Zedner seem to answer this last question in the affirmative: 
It is generally accepted that punishment for mere thoughts is objectionable, since it invades 
the individual’s private world and allows liability to turn on ideas that the individual has not 
gone so far as to bring into the external world. Moreover, individuals should be treated as 
capable of changing their mind and conforming to the criminal law, ‘because this is what it is 
to respect him as a responsible agent’. This may be a sufficient reason for ruling out ‘any 
overt act’ as an appropriate test, and also some of the ‘substantial steps’ set out in the Model 
Penal Code which involve preparatory acts such as reconnoitring a location. What is wrong 
with those tests is that they criminalize the individual as an attempter when the distance to the 
substantive offence is so great that a change of mind remains a possibility.15 
This passage suggests that the point of no return occurs where an agent becomes liable to an attempt 
charge, and it suggests further that criminalizing a preparatory act in effect pushes the point of no 
return earlier in time, at the cost of not treating the agent as responsible.  
But this line of thought is unsound. First, what is at issue is whether it is justifiable to criminalize 
steps in a harm-producing process, if the steps come before the attempted full blown crime. Even if 
                                                          
14 Ashworth and Zedner,  p. 109 
15 Ibid. p.110 
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the criminalization of very early steps is not justified, this is not because agents who go through with 
the early steps could still change their mind about the later steps.16 It is because the type of offence 
constituted by taking an early step is usually very far from producing harm. But what about steps later 
on in the process? An intermediate step –such as the act of making a working bomb—has already 
significantly increased the probability of harm. For example, a bomb that is not entirely competently 
made can become unstable and explode even if the maker does not want it to. If that happens, then 
even if the maker had abandoned the plan of detonating it in a terrorist attack, he had gone beyond the 
point of no return with respect to the threshold for harmful effects, and he is responsible for producing 
the unstable but as yet undetonated bomb. Arguably, he had reached the threshold for doing serious 
harm even earlier, when he assembled bomb-making ingredients separately. If so, then it makes sense 
to criminalize arrival at the lower threshold for doing significant harm in a way it does not make sense 
to criminalize expressions of support for past terrorist acts.  Reaching the threshold for doing 
significant harm is what matters, notwithstanding the distance between reaching this threshold and 
outright attempt, or the distance between reaching this threshold and the fully realized result of a 
terrorist attack. 
Now if a threshold for significant harm can be reached by a preparatory offence like assembling bomb 
materials, and if an agent knows that preparatory acts have been criminalized, then the law does not 
treat the agent as irresponsible by treating steps earlier than an attempt as points of no return for less 
serious offences than attempted mass-murder. For the agent presumably has the same opportunity for 
changing his mind about putting together the fertilizer and peroxide as he has, later on, for changing 
his mind about detonating the finished bomb. The line of thought developed by Ashworth and Zedner 
only reaches their preferred conclusion if all steps before attempt are harmless. 
Again, it is quite disputable to say, as Ashworth and Zedner do,  that treating someone as a 
responsible agent has some special connection with making allowances for last-minute changes of 
mind. For the most serious offences, that is, the kind of offences that are most likely to produce life-
threatening injury or death, or life-threatening injury and death on a large scale, it makes sense for the 
law to say not only ‘Don’t commit those offences –or else!’ but  ‘Don’t even go there!’ or ‘Don’t even 
think about it! --or else.’ Now this sort of injunction does not literally make a crime of something that 
goes on in an agent’s mind: it does not create a thought-crime in the strict sense. ‘Don’t even think 
about it!—or else’ does not mean ‘Don’t even conjure up the mental image of a terrorist attack!—or 
else’. It means:  ‘Don’t take so much as the first step toward a terrorist attack--or else’ –precisely the 
message of the laws that criminalize preparatory acts. When the injunctions expressed by the 
criminalization of preparatory acts are understood in this way, there is still room for dispute as to 
whether certain criminalized acts are in fact even first steps. This is the sort of dispute that might 
break out over the offence of “glorifying terrorism” in s.1. of the Terrorism Act (2000). But for the 
bomb-making step in the process of preparing a terrorist attack (which seems to engage with s.5 of the 
Terrorism Act (2000)), this dispute does not seem to me to arise, and it does not seem to treat an agent 
as irresponsible for the law to insert into their deliberations that they face a certain term of 
imprisonment for so much as assembling a bomb. Similarly for meeting a child for sex after 
grooming, as I shall argue later. 
                                                          
16 Pace  L. Alexander and K Ferzan, Crime and Culpability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 197. 
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At this point, sceptics about preventive justice may have to turn to fundamental differences in “logic” 
between punishment and prevention.17 Punishment takes account of an agent’s past law-breaking 
behaviour and imposes hard treatment proportionate to that behaviour. 
But where a measure is preventive, a rather different logic seems to be entailed— that the 
type and quantum of the measure imposed must be those judged necessary to bring about a 
significant reduction in the risk of future harm, irrespective of whether those measures are 
proportionate to any past or present conduct of the subject. ... [W]here the rationale is desert, 
the punishment must censure the subject in a way and to an extent that respects his or her 
responsible agency, and the role of prevention is to supply underlying deterrence whereas the 
choice or quantum of the sanction should be governed by proportionality considerations. 
Where prevention is the rationale its logic applies without respect for whether the subject is a 
responsible agent or not, since the purpose is to obtain the optimal preventive outcome.18 
But this line of thought is highly disputable. It implies that proportionality is at home with punishment 
but not prevention, and it is easy to think of counterexamples. Thus, it is customary for department 
stores to  prevent shoplifting by  CCTV surveillance, by alarm-activating devices attached to goods, 
and by posting  unarmed security guards at exits equipped with alarms. Preventing shoplifting by 
shooting shoplifters at exits might be more effective, but there is nothing in the logic of prevention 
that entails that shoplifting be prevented at all costs, or that shooting be preferred to arrest by unarmed 
guards when both are effective. 
Preparatory offences are proportionately less severely punished than consummated offences.  If the 
penalties reflected the alleged logic of prevention, the penalties would be whatever was sufficient to 
discourage taking first steps toward the consummated offence. Sufficiency might be associated with 
much more severe penalties than are actually threatened or applied in relation to preparatory offences. 
Again, preparatory offences work with police strategies of disrupting the plans of those embarked on 
serious crime. This is not a matter of as it were paralysing the planners of serious crime, but of 
bringing charges so as to induce the thought that continuing with those plans will be futile because the 
plans are no longer secret. 
The “different-logics” claim associates proportionate punishment for individuals after prosecution 
with respecting persons, and associates prevention with treating people indiscriminately –regardless 
of their past conduct—and treating them as appropriate sites for whatever discouraging pressures 
produce omissions of unwanted behaviour.  This sharp contrast between prevention and punishment 
makes no allowance for the way that the threat of punishment works in laws against consummated 
offences. For example, the law against homicide is addressed to everyone in a jurisdiction—
irrespective of their past or present behaviour. If ignoring past behaviour is objectionable in the 
criminalization of preparatory acts, why is it not also objectionable in the threats of punishment 
carried by laws whose prosecution starts after the fact? In laws against homicide, for example, the 
threat of hard treatment in the form of a long term of imprisonment is addressed to those who would 
not dream of killing anyone, as well as those who would.  Why does not this indiscriminate form of 
address treat too many people as dangerous if preparatory offences do?  Again, why is not the threat 
of severe treatment for homicide also open to the objection that it uses fear of imprisonment to deter 
people rather than thoughts about the costs to people of being killed? I think the Ashworth-Zedner 
argument from the different logics of prevention and punishment does imply—controversially if not 
                                                          
17 This paragraph and the next are drawn from my unpublished ‘The Scope of Serious Crime and the Justifiability of its 
Prevention’ 
18 Ashworth and Zedner, p.18 
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simply incorrectly-- that the threat in the law against homicide is objectionable for both its 
indiscriminateness and its eliciting demotivating fear rather than demotivating reasons --thoughts 
about the badness of being killed.   
Suppose the prospect of hard treatment is the only thing that keeps a particular person K from killing 
someone else. In that case the agent is –in Kantian terms--only pathologically driven, not governed by 
practical reason. Fear of imprisonment rather than an understanding of the reasons why homicide is 
wrong operates to deter K from homicide. Although he is not a typical agent, K is still a suitable 
addressee of a law against homicide. This made sense to Kant because he thought people in general 
were hybrids of pathology and autonomy, and that juridical law added engagement with pathology to 
the moral law against killing, which only engages with reason. Typically the juridical law as Kant 
conceives it addresses both elements of the hybrid, providing in Kant’s terms  “pathological” or 
inclination-based motivation in addition to moral motivation for not killing. In other words, there are 
reasons for not killing that most agents can understand and accept, and these can motivate alongside 
the threat of hard treatment, or independently of it, to produce compliance with the law against 
homicide. It is not as if the pathology-engaging part of the law –the “or else”--denies or cancels out 
the agency of most addressees, that is, agency in the form of receptiveness to moral reasons. The mere 
fact that a threat is made by the law does not imply that the law treats an agent as solely 
pathologically motivated –impervious to the other reasons against homicide. Not everything in the 
law has to treat its addressees as (fully) responsible, according to Kant. The Ashworth-Zedner 
position seems incorrectly to deny this. 
Writers other than Ashworth and Zedner, including Simester,19 seem to require that the law, in 
Waldron’s phrase, should not be “brute” at the same time as it is mandatory. It should treat its 
addressees as fully responsible, which, according to Simester, it can fail to do in the case of 
preparatory offences. I have just suggested that the law need not treat all of its addressees as fully 
responsible in the sense of always being open to the force of strong reasons for aborting a course of 
action leading to a consummated offence. But in the case of preparatory offences where what 
Simester calls a “nexus” condition is met –the otherwise harmless proscribed thing is done by an 
agent with an intention to do harm20-- the agent is responsible for the preparatory behaviour, and the 
behaviour is not innocent in the sense of not intended to be harmful.   
Simester asks how justification for the criminalization of preparatory acts can rule out the 
criminalization of an act of eating cereal that serves to nourish an intending murderer. I think the 
answer may be to develop the nexus requirement more fully. Unless eating cereal instantiates a type 
that is mentioned by a statement of a causal regularity leading to a type of serious harm, it does not 
meet a nexus requirement.  To illustrate, it might be true that eating cereal is nourishing and that being 
nourished helps agents carry out their plans, but that is not a causal regularity that leads to harm, since 
being helped to carry out a plan is not a type of harm. Again, it is not always true that eating cereal 
helps intending murderers to carry out murderous plans just because eating cereal helps people to 
carry out their plans. Someone who is hungry and is planning a murder is not necessarily in need of 
food in order to commit the murder. He may need food anyway. The nexus requirement, suitably 
nuanced, may be the key to keeping the justification for preparatory offences from becoming too 
permissive. 
 
                                                          
19 “Prophylactic Offences” in G.R. Sullivan and I Dennis, Seeking Security: Pre-empting the Commission of Criminal 
Harms (Oxford: Hart, 2012), p. 70 
20 Ibid. p. 67f. 
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3. The appropriate threshold for a preparatory grooming offence 
Ashworth and Zedner include Section 15 offences among the targets of their onslaught on the 
criminalization of preparatory acts. But is Section 15 comparable to problematic provisions in 
counter-terrorist legislation? For example, does it criminalize a type of preparatory act that occurs too 
early in the typical stages of the process leading from the online grooming of a child to sexual assault? 
There are two aspects to this question. First, it implies, perhaps objectionably, that harm is only 
inflicted at the stage of sexual assault, and not in the grooming. Later, I dispute this. But beforehand I 
consider whether the Section 15 preparatory offence justifiably focuses on the meeting stage of the 
process of grooming for sex.  
To sharpen this question, let us consider the (in England and Wales) fictional offence of sexualizing 
an online conversation with someone believed to be under 16. Suppose that this offence is committed 
if and only if (i) sexual content is introduced into an online conversation with a child; (ii) the 
conversation partner introducing the sexual content is over 18; and (iii) the sexual content might 
reasonably be believed to express an intention to meet a child after grooming. Someone whose 
behaviour meets these conditions might not yet have proposed a meeting in so many words, but might 
have behaved in a way which a reasonable person would believe was putting sex on the agenda in an 
ongoing online relationship with a child.21  
If there were an offence of sexualizing an online conversation, then that would criminalize a step in 
the process leading to a sexual assault that occurred earlier than meeting a child after grooming. This 
might qualify as a suspect precursor offence for the same reason that some precursor offences in the 
case of terrorism are suspect: namely, the looseness of the connection between that kind of offence 
and outright sexual assault: that is, although sexualized conversation may raise the probability of a 
sexual assault, it is causally insufficient for such an assault. 
Would the fictitious offence of sexualizing an online conversation with a child be justified, then, if 
incorporated into the Sexual Offences Act (2003)? The looseness-of-the-connection point is one 
reason to think not, but there are also empirical reasons. Recent and influential empirical work on sex 
crime distinguishes between contact and fantasy groomers among those who are operating in online 
chat rooms.22 According to this work, there are some chat line groomers who are content with sexual 
fantasies generated by sexualized conversations. These groomers do not wish or intend to meet their 
conversation partners: the fantasies fuelled by conversation with children by themselves provide 
material for auto-erotic gratification. For these groomers, then, the sexualization of online content is 
not a preparation for sexual contact, let alone sexual assault.  
The existence of fantasy groomers constitutes an objection to a preparatory offence of sexualization 
of online conversation with a child. It may even count against an offence of sexualizing conversation 
with children, when the makeup of the group at the receiving end of these conversations is taken into 
account.  For child targets of online grooming are themselves not all of one kind. According to the 
taxonomy developed by the European Online Grooming Project,23 there is a “resilient” child internet 
user, and this type predominates: 
                                                          
21 My imaginary offence of sexualizing a conversation seems to resemble section 474.27 of the Australian Criminal Code 
Act (1995), which carries a penalty of 12 years imprisonment. See Choo, op.cit. p. 4 
22 Peter Briggs, Walter T. Simon, and Stacy Simonsen ‘An Exploratory Study of Internet-Initiated Sexual Offenses and the 
Chat Room Sex Offender: Has the Internet Enabled a New Typology of Sex Offender?’ 
Sex Abuse March 2011 23: 72-91 
23 Stephen Webster et al, European Online Grooming Project, Final Report, 2012: 
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the greater proportion of young people approached [in our research study] were resilient and 
refused to engage when they sensed the person they were talking to was ‘weird’. For example, 
some young people were described as abruptly ending initial interactions by: cutting-off the 
online link when the groomer started a sexual conversation; blocking the groomer on the site; 
and/or hanging up the mobile phone.24 
If a large number of children interacting online with others can recognize sexualization as a danger 
signal, and are able safely to discontinue contact with groomers once sexualization of conversation 
begins; if they are able to shrug off that online experience, then perhaps the sexualization offence we 
have invented is not properly regarded as an offence leading to sexual contact, or even as harmful 
enough to criminalize. Of course, the “resilient” child group could in the future shrink as a proportion 
of the total number of children using online chat rooms. If the proportion of “resilient” children in 
chat rooms became tiny, and the proportion of very isolated and vulnerable children was much higher 
than research indicates it currently is, the argument from harm for the sexualization offence might be 
strengthened.  
On balance, however, the case for a preparatory offence of sexualization of online conversation does 
not look strong. Do problems with that offence infect other preparatory offences, including Section 
15? The answer is a clear ‘No’. First, Section 15 has a far higher threshold for charges than the 
sexualization offence. Section 15 requires (i) a minimum level (2 occasions at least) of contact 
between someone over 18 and a child; (ii) evidence of a plan on the part of the person over 18 to meet 
the child; and (iii) actual travel toward the agreed meeting point by the person over 18 after that 
person has sexualized the conversation and expressed a desire for sex with the child. Behaviour that 
satisfies these conditions indicates that grooming as opposed to some other behaviour is being 
displayed.25   
Section 15, then, cannot be criticized on the same grounds as the sexualization offence. Not only does 
it exclude fantasy groomers, but it requires persistence in online contact, typically, sexualized contact. 
Nor, in my view, can Section 15 be criticized as excessive just because it is a pre-attempt offence. 
Here an analogy with pre-attempt terrorism offences may help. We agreed in the last section that 
some pre-attempt offences raise the probability of harm significantly, while others are only very 
loosely associated with harm, if associated with harm at all. Behaviour fitting the Section 15 offence 
comes closer to preparatory offences in the case of terrorism that raise the probability of harm e.g. 
part-assembling a bomb, than those that by themselves are only loosely connected with harm e.g. an 
act of “glorifying” terrorism. In other words, meeting a child after grooming comes closer to being 
harmful in its own right than to being only loosely connected with harm.  
To go back to the argument of the last section, although assembling materials for explosives is 
perhaps not sufficient for an attempted terrorist attack, it does reach a threshold for being a dangerous 
act, in that assembling explosives before detonation could itself be lead to explosion. For some 
groomers, physical proximity to a child will increase the probability of an assault much more than 
online contact, even when webcams and message-exchanges in real time bring virtual meetings much 
closer as experiences to physical meetings. So taking the step of achieving physical proximity can by 
itself be very dangerous, which creates a prima facie case for criminalization.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.europeanonlinegroomingproject.com/media/2076/european-online-grooming-project-final-report.pdf 
24 European Online Grooming Project, p. 100 
25 On arrest for a Section 15 offence, the groomer will be searched, and if he is found in possession of condoms or 
lubricating jelly, those items as well as the record of intercepted conversations with the child will be treated as evidence of 
the intention to go through with sex, and therefore (given the age of the child) sexual assault, in the course of a meeting. 
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Aiming at physical proximity distinguishes fantasy groomers from contact groomers, and some 
contact groomers can be, in the taxonomy of the European Grooming project, “hyper-sexualized”:  
The hyper-sexualised group of men were characterised by extensive indecent image 
collections of children and significant online contact with other sexual offenders or offender 
groups. Some men in this group also had significant collections of extreme adult 
pornography. They adopted different identities altogether, or had an identity picture that was 
not of their face but of their genitals. Their contacts with young people were highly sexualised 
and escalated very quickly. 26 
This is the group that the Section 15 offence seems to fit best, especially if members of that group 
succeed in arranging a meeting with children who, rather than being “resilient,” are, in the taxonomy 
of the European Grooming Project, either “vulnerable” or “risk-taking”. Table 3 summarizes the 
 
Table 3. Characteristics of Vulnerable and Risk-Taking Victims of Online Grooming 
characteristics of vulnerable and risk-taking child users of internet.27 Vulnerable users tend to be more 
isolated and sometimes use childlike chat room avatars.  
Contact grooming is a process with characteristic stages, and an early stage is scanning the online 
environment for displays of characteristics associated with either vulnerable or risk-taking children.28 
Online groomers are good at identifying children who turn to the internet for a social life and affection 
that elude them offline.  These fit the profile of “vulnerable” children. Groomers will manipulate these 
children by expressing sympathy and admiration in turn. Risk-taking children, by contrast, will 
overestimate their ability to control or hold their own in online sexualized conversations, and may 
experiment with flirtatious behaviour that can attract the hyper-sexualized groomer.  
Section 15 would be criticizable if (i) it were appropriate only for hyper-sexualized groomers of 
vulnerable and risk-taking children but (ii) these turned out individually and in combination to make 
up only an insignificant proportion of actual groomers and victims of sexual assault. In fact, however, 
Section 15 fits the whole range of contact groomers, and “Hypersexualized” is only one of three 
classifications used in the European Online Grooming research. Contact groomers belonging to all 
three types have gone on to have illegal sexual contact with children after grooming them in broadly 
                                                          
26 Ibid. p. 85 
27 Ibid. p. 15 
28 Ibid. p. 8f 
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similar ways.  Besides hypersexualized groomers there are “intimacy-seeking” and “adaptable” 
groomers. 
“Intimacy-seeking” groomers29 according to the European Online Grooming project, do not typically 
collect sexual images of children and have no prior convictions for sexual offences. They described 
themselves as seeking consenting sexual relationships, rather than one-off encounters. They did not 
exploit anonymity on the internet and were quite willing to move from online to telephone contact, 
again being truthful in their offline conversations about their age and identity. Intimacy-seeking 
groomers, then, tend to share few characteristics with hypersexualized groomers. Between those two 
extremes lie “adaptable” groomers, men who typically had previous convictions, collected images on 
a modest scale, and had contacts with other groomers and online offenders. They are closer to 
hypersexualized offenders than intimacy-seeking ones. Their distinguishing characteristic is an ability 
to tailor their style of grooming to whatever type of child seems receptive to their online overtures. 
These groomers, then, can adapt to the different requirements of both “vulnerable” and risk-taking 
online conversation-partners.30  The sample on which this typology is based was composed of mainly 
middle-aged make groomers whose conversation partners and eventual victims were 13 to 15 years of 
age.31 
Section 15 seems to cohere well, then, with what the empirical research reveals to be the behaviour of 
contact groomers. Although there are different typologies of groomers and of the grooming process in 
this literature, review articles indicate that competing approaches identify many of the same things as 
salient. For example, grooming consists not only of a scanning or surveillance stage, but of an initial 
contact and getting-acquainted stage, followed by rapport-building, exchange of confidences, and 
joint problem solving. After sexual contact takes place there is the process of making the victim 
compliant in keeping it secret. 32   
While online and offline grooming processes have various things in common—they may share the 
stages of scanning, rapport-building, the exchange of confidences and joint problem solving—they 
also diverge.  Offline grooming seems distinctively to require the cultivation by the groomer of a 
caring public image.  When the groomer does not target his own children or family members, he often 
befriends the parents of young children and gains access to other children through volunteer work in 
youth clubs.  It is different with internet-based grooming. Online chat rooms allow groomers to 
bypass parents and dispense with public image-building. When chat room contact is combined with 
deception about the groomer’s age, it can create the online impression of a romantic approach from 
another teenager, an illusion that offline grooming would normally exclude. In some respects, then, 
online grooming can be more deceptive and more insidious than its offline counterpart. Then there is 
the connection between sexual abuse facilitated online and the production of pornographic records of 
that abuse, which in a sense immortalize it and can further traumatize the victim.33 
Section 15 is not addressed to online grooming alone, but is it appropriately framed for online 
grooming? I think the answer is ‘Yes’. First of all, it sets an age threshold for the offence. Someone 
charged under section 15 must be an adult. So sexualized conversation between teenagers under 18 is 
                                                          
29 Ibid. pp. 81ff 
30 Ibid. pp. 83ff 
31 Ibid. p. 89. For a related taxonomy , see Karen J. Terry & Jennifer Tallon, ‘Child Sexual Abuse: A Review of the 
Literature’ (The John Jay College Research Team, 2004) http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/child-and-youth-
protection/upload/child-sexual-abuse-literature-review-john-jay-college-2004.pdf  
32 See Whittle, H. C., Hamilton-Giachritsis, C., Beech, A., & Collings, G. (2013).  A Review of young people’s 
vulnerabilities to online grooming, Aggression and Violent Behavior, 18, 62-70, esp. §2.3   
33 K Raymond Choo, Online Child Grooming: A Literature Review  on the Misuse of   Social Networking Sites for 
Grooming Children for Sexual Offences grooming( Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2007) p.xii.:(  
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excluded, even if one of them is vulnerable or isolated and is in fact being targeted by the other. The 
central case of an older offender pretending to be the same age as the victim in order to facilitate a 
meeting is catered for, reflecting the particular hazards of online anonymity and the abilities of 
offenders to simulate teenage online chat.  In the case where the provisions of section 15 are 
otherwise met but the target of the grooming is in fact a persona created by an undercover police 
officer, the groomer can be charged with an attempt of a section 15 offence.34  
How completely does the section 15 insistence on age difference between the offender and the victim 
exclude unwanted consequences? Various issues are broached by this question, some having to do 
with the international reach of section 15, and the variation internationally in the recognized age of 
consent to sex. Table 4 shows age of consent to sex by country as of 2007. Ignoring changes to those 
ages that have been decreed since, we can see that an arrangement in 2007 by an English or Welsh 
person to meet a  consenting 13-year old in Spain for sex would have counted as an offence under 
section 15 once the English or Welsh person had travelled to Spain. This may seem incongruous if an 
arrangement to meet in Spain, entered into by an English person in Spain after grooming in Spain, 
would not have been an offence.  
Another issue arises from setting 18 years as the threshold for adulthood. Conditions for a section 15 
offence could be met by travel prompted by a sexualized teenage conversation between someone who 
was 15 years and 364 days and someone else who was 18 years and one day. Clearly this is not the 
central case of the deceiving older offender posing as a very young person for the purpose of meeting 
for sex, and it is a question whether in this kind of case a prosecution would actually be brought, or 
whether it would be selected for undercover police intervention. On the other hand, in a highly 
publicized recent case in England, Lewis Daynes sexually assaulted and killed a 14-year old boy 
whom he had groomed online. Daynes was only 19. The boy’s mother had reported the grooming to 
the police and had been ignored. Section 15 is not well-designed for this exceptional sort of case; but 
this is compatible with saying that it is well designed for typical online grooming offences.35 
                                                          
34 http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/rape_and_sexual_offences/soa_2003_and_soa_1956/#a29 The common grooming 
tactic of getting the victim to produce a sexualized image of herself (which may later be used for blackmail purposes or 
posted shared with selected others online) is also catered for in other parts of the Sexual Offences Act. 
 
35 Something like an endorsement of section 15 within a human rights frameworkis provided by Alisdair Gillespie in early 
commentary on the Sexual offences Act (2003) in Childright : 
http://www2.essex.ac.uk/clc/hi/childright/article/204/index.html#cR204_2 
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Table 4. Age of Consent by Country in 2007. Source: Choo, op.cit, p. 49 
 
4. Undercover operations leading to Section 15 prosecutions  
In many jurisdictions anti-grooming legislation is enforced in sting operations conducted by 
undercover police. Officers pose as children in chat rooms likely to be used by groomers, and they 
maintain conversational contact over periods ranging from days to months. There are two kinds of 
case. Either the undercover officers assume the online identity of children whose grooming has 
reached the point where a meeting has been proposed; or else police officers impersonate a child with 
characteristics likely to appeal to a contact groomer.  When the groomer responds to the child persona 
built up by the police, a conversation develops that over time culminates in an invitation to meet from 
the groomer.  
Undercover operations often if not always involve deception, and when they are directed against 
individual paedophiles or paedophile rings, they carry the risks of engaging in other kinds of morally 
and legally dubious behaviour. For example, to maintain cover, a police officer may have to hold back 
from intervening in the commission of a crime. When the undercover operation involves active child 
17 
 
abuse on the part of a paedophile ring being infiltrated, the broadcast rape of children in real time is 
sometimes passively witnessed for the sake of collecting evidence and mounting a large-scale 
prosecution. Are the moral costs of these operations justified by their results, if their results include 
the destruction of large, international paedophile rings? Arguably, yes.  On the other hand, what if an 
operation is focused on one or two online groomers, and they are in fact fantasy groomers rather than 
contact groomers? What if undercover operations in this area run the risk of legal entrapment –where 
offences are committed only with the strong encouragement of police masquerading as children or as 
willing members of paedophile rings? 
In considering these questions, it is important to distinguish between operations against paedophile 
rings, which involve active and frequent sexual assault of children, and operations against 
uncoordinated online groomers, who may aim at sexual assault, but who may or may not be engaging 
in any sexual assault at the time they are in contact with undercover officers. Deception and apparent 
but very short-term collusion by the police may be tolerable if it breaks up a ring of child rapists for 
good, but how far can officers justifiably cut corners in operations against groomers? 
In its most general form the question before us is that of whether the harm produced by grooming 
leading to sexual assault is so severe that undercover preventive policing is justified. The answer to 
this question could be ‘Yes’, even if particular preventive policing operations are morally and legally 
defective. The answer does appear to be ‘Yes’. For apart from the harm of rape involved in much 
sexual abuse, to which at least all contact grooming is intended to lead, there is a wide variety of 
harms associated with online grooming. These range from depression, sexual dysfunction and drug-
dependence to difficulty making friends, uncertainty over one’s gender or sexual preferences and 
suicidal and other self-harming tendencies.36 When one considers that sexually explicit images of 
children are often produced during the online grooming process, and that groomers sometimes 
threaten to post these on the internet or email them to parents and friends if the child does not co-
operate, the adverse psychological effects of grooming are not hard to appreciate. Other things being 
equal, these seem to be serious enough harms to justify preventive measures, even where the 
preventive measures include deception and secrecy. 
We can distinguish, nevertheless, between the ethics of assuming the identity of a genuine child who 
is already being groomed, and developing the persona of a child online to see whether a groomer will 
make contact and suggest a meeting. In the former case, it is not true that, but for the intervention of 
the police, the grooming and the arrangement to meet would not have taken place. In the other case 
this arguably is true. For the persona of the child is wholly manufactured by the undercover officer, 
and not, as in the case where the police take over the online identity of a child, a matter of replacing a 
real child who is being urged by the groomer to have sex. It may be true in the case of the wholly 
manufactured persona that if the groomer had not made contact with that persona he would have made 
contact with and probably harmed a real child. But this fact, where it is one, does not absolve the 
undercover officer of a much more active role in the cultivation of the groomer’s interest than in the 
case where the officer merely continues online contact already established entirely independently of 
police deception. The more actively the undercover officer is involved in the creation of a kind of 
persona likely to appeal to a sex offender, the more active the undercover officer is in the process that 
is causally responsible for the invitation to meet. I am not suggesting that none of the causation comes 
from the offender, but more comes from the offender when all the police officer does is continue a 
                                                          
36 Choo, p.39, summarizing Melissa Wells & Kimberly J Mitchell ‘Youth Sexual Exploitation on the Internet: DSM-IV 
Diagnoses and Gender Differences in Co-occurring Mental Health Issues’, Child and Adolescent Social Work Journal, Vol. 
24, No. 3, June 2007, pp.235-60, http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/CV128.pdf  
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conversation that has probably gone on for weeks, that the groomer is in control of, and that has been 
skilfully steered in the direction of sex.  
The problems in the case of the wholly manufactured child persona are magnified if one accepts the 
distinction between fantasy and contact groomers, and if one accepts that fantasy and contact 
groomers can both find sexualized conversation and even the fantasy of meeting for sex highly 
gratifying. This means that the suggestion of meeting could come from either kind of offender, and 
that even a fantasy offender could be convicted in a jurisdiction in which the suggestion of a meeting, 
without steps taken to meet the offender, could suffice for an offence. Section 15, as already pointed 
out, is well framed for weeding out fantasy groomers, but other anti-grooming offences in other 
jurisdictions are not, and these may produce injustice when combined with sting operations that 
succeed when the evidence of an intention to meet and have sex does not include travel to a meeting.37 
So far I have been suggesting that, other things being equal, operations that continue contact with a 
groomer are morally more acceptable than operations in which contact is initiated by the undercover 
officer. This position does not imply that operations against groomers in which children are never 
involved are never justified. Since groomers often cultivate several potential targets simultaneously, it 
can prevent harm to real children if one of the targets of the grooming is in fact a police officer. 
Again, a sting operation in which a groomer targets an undercover officer can lead to the discovery 
that a repeat offender is offending again, or that he is violating his parole or other court-ordered 
restrictions. In this sort of case the benefits of the sting operation extend beyond protecting children to 
acting as a check on compliance with bail or parole conditions. 
 If the groomers are repeat-offenders, then, since many offenders are involved in online exchange of 
child pornography, which can in turn be produced and distributed by full-scale paedophile rings, the 
anti-grooming undercover operation can actually lead to an operation that prevents much worse harm 
than grooming much more quickly than in the absence of an undercover operation. In short, because 
of the interconnections between grooming offences, offences consisting of making and distributing 
images, and organized sexual assault, even deceptive sting operations which manufacture a child 
persona attractive to groomers may be amply justified by the harm they prevent or help to prevent. 
There is a risk of legal entrapment of a groomer if the online conversation produced by a sting 
operation seems to offer a special incentive to the groomer to propose a meeting. An operation is 
more likely to produce a successful prosecution if the idea of meeting comes from the groomer, once 
the age of the “child” in the sting operation has been established, and the sexualization of the 
conversation has been initiated by the groomer. Many online conversations with groomers actually 
follow this pattern. Could there be circumstances, however, in which entrapment was morally 
necessary, notwithstanding the resulting failure of a prosecution? 
The answer seems to me to be ‘Yes’. Here we can imagine a sting operation that has revealed that the 
groomer is a repeat offender who has been convicted of a series of serious sexual assaults. We can 
imagine that he is also forensically aware, and that he has already raised several times with the “child” 
he is grooming the point that he is concerned that either the child’s parents or the police will find out 
                                                          
37 Can even someone who travels to a meeting disown the intention to meet for sex? In filmed confrontations of groomers 
who turn up at a meeting place, undercover police are sometimes told that the groomer was only coming to warn the child of 
the dangers of internet relationships. schttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VrhEZBl0qrQ; 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YAS6XOsEd0s These claims are unconvincing on camera, but have succeed in at least 
one US court case. See Choo, op.cit.p.31 
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about their proposed meeting. Suppose he proposes a meeting place in which there are many escape 
routes, and which would make an arrest difficult. In such a case, for the sake of a more certain arrest, 
and the likelihood of disrupting his grooming, it might be justifiable for him to be given a special 
reason to go to a location where arrest is easier for the police, notwithstanding the grounds the 
defence at trial might have for excluding some evidence. A related case is where some of the evidence 
that the police uses to arrest a groomer comes from an internet vigilante group that makes contact with 
a groomer without the knowledge or co-operation of the police. The internet group would not have 
received the legal authorizations that a comparable police operation would have depended upon, 
creating grounds for the exclusion of evidence at trial in England and Wales. In cases like these the 
moral case for disruption may be stronger than the moral case for meeting the legal requirements of a 
successful prosecution under Section 15.38 
5. Conclusion 
Section 15 of the Sexual Offences Act (2003) seems to survive general objections to preparatory 
offences in general brought by critics like Ashworth and Zedner. This is partly because the online 
grooming process often involves significant harm in its own right, including coerced production of 
sexualized images and blackmail involving the threat of publicizing those images to force the 
production of more.   Harm is not only in the offing when the groomer is in a position to commit a 
Part One sexual assault. Again, Section 15 justifiably focuses on meeting after grooming rather than 
sexualized conversation as the trigger for arrest and prosecution. Offences that gear arrest only to 
evidence of online sexualized conversation between children and older groomers would probably 
lump together fantasy with contact groomers. Many moral risks attend undercover operations in 
which the police manufacture a child persona rather than assume the identity of a child that has been 
subject to grooming. But these risks may often justifiably be run in view of the dangers posed by 
hypersexualized groomers and the online grooming process itself.  
  
 
                                                          
38 I am grateful to Chris Nathan and Jethro Butler for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Research for this paper was 
funded by  the ESRC project “Assuming Identities Online (Project No.ES/L003279/1). 
